Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by
the Seton Hall Circuit Review members, of circuit splits identified
by a federal court of appeals opinion between April 1, 2005 and
August 31, 2005. This collection is organized first according to
Civil/Criminal Matters, then by area of law.
Each summary is intended to give only the briefest
overview of a current split, not a comprehensive analysis.
Likewise, this compilation is by no means exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Voting Rights Act: Felon Disenfranchisement – Johnson v.
Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
In this case, one issue on appeal was whether Florida’s felon
disenfranchisement law, which denies convicted felons the right to vote,
is in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973). The
11th Circuit held that “interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
deny Florida the discretion to disenfranchise felons raises serious
constitutional problems because such an interpretation allows a
congressional statute to override the text of the constitution.” Id. at 1229.
The constitutional problem arises from the 14th Amendment’s
proscription of the right to vote “for participation in rebellion, or other
crime.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 2. Therefore, the court sided with
the 2nd Circuit by affirming the lower court and holding that § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act does not apply to felon disenfranchisement provisions.
Id. In doing so, the court declined to follow the 9th Circuit’s ruling in
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), which found
that a felon disenfranchisement provision violated § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. at 1232. Furthermore, although the 6th Circuit assumed
that § 2 applied to felon disenfranchisement laws, it held that there was
no violation. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th Cir.
1986).
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) – Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d
801 (6th Cir. 2005)
The plaintiff, a prisoner, alleged that he was a victim of excessive
force and retaliation. Id. at 804-05. The issue was whether the PLRA
required a dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint when both exhausted and
unexhausted claims were alleged. Id. at 806. The court noted that some
circuits required total exhaustion, while others did not. Id. The 6th
Circuit joined the 8th and 10th Circuits in holding that total exhaustion is
required under the PLRA. Id. In so holding, the court reasoned that the
PLRA’s plain language called for such a result and that the policies
underlying the PLRA required total exhaustion of the claims. Id. at 807.
The policies, as noted by the court, included reducing frivolous actions
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and giving prisons the opportunity to solve problems internally. Id.
Lastly, the court stated that “adopting the total exhaustion rule creates
comity between 1983 claims and habeas corpus claims.” Id.
ERISA: Jurisdiction – Mid. Atl. Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Sereboff,
407 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2005)
The 4th Circuit in this matter joined the 5th, 7th, and 10th Circuits
in holding that an ERISA “plan fiduciary may maintain an action for
equitable relief if the plan is seeking to recover funds that are specifically
identifiable, belong in good conscience to the fiduciary, and are within
the possession and control of the beneficiary.” Id. at 219. Conversely, the
6th and 9th Circuits have held that that a “plan fiduciary’s assertion of a
subrogation right to reimbursement from a plan beneficiary who has
received payments from a third party is legal in nature, regardless of
whether the beneficiary possesses that recovery in an identifiable fund.”
Id. at 219 n.7. The split among the circuits involve the interpretation of
the phrase “other appropriate equitable relief” as it is found in ERISA.
Id.
Environmental Regulation: Public Notice & Access
Requirements – Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v.
EPA, 410 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2005)
The issue in this case was whether Notices of Intent (“NOI”) and
Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plans (“SWPPP”) are considered to be
permit applications requiring public notice and access where the statute
is silent. See id. at 977. The EPA issues general permits, which allow
companies to release storm water discharge from industrial activities into
navigable waters, by approving applications for a NOI and site-specific
SWPPP. Id. at 967-69. The 7th Circuit agreed with the EPA’s
characterization of the nature of the NOIs and SWPPPs and noted a
circuit split with regards to the 9th Circuit’s opinion that NOIs were
equal to permits and should be subject to public availability. Id. at 978.
The split is created by the 7th Circuit’s determination that NOIs and
SWPPPs are not permit applications requiring public notice and access.
Id.
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ADA: Reasonable Accommodation for Individuals “Regarded
as” Disabled – D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220
(11th Cir. 2005)
This case required the 11th Circuit to decide whether the “ADA’s
reasonable accommodation requirement applies to the regarded-as
category of disabled individuals.” Id. at 1235. The court found that based
on a review of the plain language of the ADA, “regarded as” individuals
are “entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA.” Id. The
court based its holding on a plain reading of the statute whereby the court
found that the language makes no distinction between an individual “in
the actual-impairment sense” to an individual regarded as disabled. Id.
The 11th Circuit’s findings in this case are in line with the 3rd Circuit’s
holding in Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751
(2004), and the 1st Circuit’s implicit holding in Katz v. City Metal Co.,
87 F.3d 26 (1996), where the 1st Circuit indirectly addressed the issue by
assuming that the ADA applied to the “regarded as” class of individuals.
Id.
However, the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Circuits all have found that the
ADA reasonable accommodation requirements did not apply to
individuals regarded as disabled. Id. Those courts found that “requiring
employers to accommodate individuals they merely regard as disabled
would produce anomalous results that Congress could not have
intended.” Id. at 1237. The 11th Circuit dismissed this rationale by
stating that it is not for the courts to decide whether the statute drafted by
the legislature may produce some anomalous effects, but instead it must
uphold the statute as it reads. Id. at 1238. Therefore, the 11th Circuit
joined the 1st and 3rd Circuits in holding that the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation requirement extends to individuals regarded as disabled.
Id. at 1239-40.
Lanham Act: Equitable Defenses – Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,
415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
This case presented the D.C. Circuit with the issue of whether the
equitable defense of laches is available to a defendant in an action
alleging violation of the Lanham Trademark Act. Id. The D.C. Circuit
noted that the 3rd Circuit has held that the defense of laches was
unavailable in such a cause of action, while the Federal Circuit permitted
such use. Id. at 48. The D.C. Circuit adopted the position of the Federal
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Circuit, noting that the Act “explicitly permits consideration of laches
and other equitable doctrines . . . .” Id.
IMMIGRATION

Jurisdiction: Appeals at BIA “Streamlining” Procedures – Sarr
v. Gonzales, 127 F. App’x 815 (6th Cir. 2005)
The 6th Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed an
Immigration Judge’s factual finding that human rights conditions in the
African nation of Mauritania had changed sufficiently to rebut an alien’s
fear of future persecution upon removal from the United States. Id. at
817. On appeal, Sarr challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) use of a “streamlined” procedure to affirm the IJ’s findings. Id.
at 817-18.
The 6th Circuit acknowledged a split among the circuits that have
addressed the issue of whether it has jurisdiction to review a BIA
decision to streamline a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). Id. at
819 n.1. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits have declared “that at
least a certain subset of BIA decisions to streamline [is] reviewable.” Id.
The BIA’s decision to streamline a case generally is not reviewable
according to the 8th and 10th Circuits. Id. at 819 n.2.
Without deciding whether it had the jurisdiction to make such a
determination, the 6th Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision to streamline
Sarr’s appeal. Id. at 819 n.3. “Assuming that we can review the BIA’s
decision,” the 6th Circuit noted, Sarr’s “cursory arguments” that merely
asserted “substantial factual and legal issues” were insufficient to
challenge the BIA’s procedure. Id. at 817, 819.
Jurisdiction: Appeals of BIA Discretionary Decisions – Mariuta
v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2005)
The transitional rules under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) provide that a court
will not have jurisdiction of an appeal from a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) where the decision was made under one of
the statutory sections and was made under the agency’s discretion. Id. at
364. The 2nd Circuit affirmed the standard used by other circuits to
determine that they did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter, but
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noted a discrepancy with the 3rd Circuit’s contrary decision finding
jurisdiction over a BIA decision because it was not considered to have
been made “on the merits.” Id. at 367 n.7. The 2nd Circuit expressly
disagreed with the 3rd Circuit’s opinion, and noted that there should not
have been jurisdiction in that matter where the decision was made under
the agency’s discretion. Id.
Relief: Nunc Pro Tunc – Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 2005)
This case presented the 1st Circuit with the issue of whether nunc
pro tunc relief is available where an alien has become ineligible for a
discretionary waiver of deportation. Id. at 46 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)).
Eligibility is barred where “an alien who has been convicted of one or
more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.” Id. at 40. The 1st Circuit
declined to follow the 2nd Circuit, which had held that such relief was
available. Id. In doing so, the court noted that “the language of [the
statute makes clear that] the relief sought simply does not exist for an
aggravated felon who has served five years of his felony term.” Id. at 47.
Deportation: Reinstatement Procedures – Tilley v. Chertoff, 144
F. App’x 536 (6th Cir. 2005)
In this per curiam opinion, the 6th Circuit considered a circuit split
over whether the reinstatement procedures for deporting illegal
immigrants under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 are constitutional. Id. at 539. The
court noted that the 1st and 8th Circuits have held that the regulations
“fall within the discretion of the Attorney General.” Id. The 9th Circuit,
however, declared the regulations unconstitutional based on their
findings that an immigration judge shall conduct these proceedings and
the regulations under 8 C.F.R. § 241(a)(5) do not allow for this
procedure. Id. at 539-40. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit
and held that, under the plain language of § 241(a)(5), if it is found by
the Attorney General that an alien has illegally reentered the United
States after prior removal or voluntary departure, the prior order of
removal is reinstated and not subject to be reopened or reviewed, nor
may the alien apply for relief. Id. at 540. The court held that the
regulations in § 241.8 met all of the requirements of § 241(a)(5) and,
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therefore, no ambiguity existed that required review. Id. The court also
held that the reinstated order did not violate due process. Id. at 541.
Removal Proceedings: Adjustment of Status Eligibility – Moulle
v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2005)
Congolese husband and wife aliens sought review of orders from
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) which denied their
application for asylum and motion to reopen removal proceedings. They
sought a remand so that they could apply for adjustment of alien status
under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Petitioners argued, in the alternative, that 8
C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) (limiting eligibility for 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) relief to
“arriving aliens in removal proceedings”) was invalid. Regarding their
second argument, the court created a split with the 1st Circuit by holding
that the regulatory bar to status adjustment in 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8)
was valid. Unlike the 1st Circuit, the 8th Circuit did not find that the
statute was invalid due to the discretionary nature of the relief available
under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, nor did it find a “basis upon which to conclude
that th[e] regulation does not embody the Attorney General’s decision
not to afford discretionary relief to the delineated class of aliens –
arriving aliens in removal proceedings.” Id. at 928. “While Congress
surely did speak to eligibility in [§ 1255], it left the question, of whether
adjustment-of-status relief should be granted, to the Attorney General’s
discretion.” Id.
Illegal Reentry: Scienter – United States v. Rodriguez, 416 F.3d
123 (2d Cir. 2005)
This case presented the 2nd Circuit with the issue of whether the
offense of attempted reentry is a specific intent crime that requires the
government to allege and prove that a previously deported alien intended
to reenter the Unite States. Id. at 124 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)). Relying
on the “common law’s requirement of specific intent for attempt crimes,”
the 9th Circuit has held that Congress intended an attempted reentry
under § 1326(a) to be a crime of specific intent. Id. at 126. However,
based on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, the
2nd Circuit joined the 1st, 5th and 11th Circuits in holding that there is
no “heightened mens rea requirement in cases of attempted reentry.” Id.
at 125, 127.
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Illegal Reentry: Retroactivity – Labojewski v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d
814 (7th Cir. 2005)
In Labojewski, the 7th Circuit declined to follow the 8th Circuit,
which held that an “illegal reentry by itself is enough to trigger the
presumption against retroactivity” of the Illegal Immigration Reform &
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). Id. at 822. The 7th Circuit
declined to recognize as reasonable “any claimed reliance on the
perpetual availability of discretionary adjustment of status from the
moment an alien contemplates illegal entry.” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit
concluded that § 1231(a)(5) of IIRIRA “does not operate in an
impermissibly retroactive fashion when applied against an alien who
illegally reentered the United States before but did not apply for
adjustment of status until after IIRIRA’s effective date.” Id. at 823.
IIRIRA: Reliance and Retroactivity – Kelava v. Gonzales, 410
F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2005)
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) § 304(b) repealed § 212(c) and replaced it with “a
new form of discretionary relief called cancellation of removal, codified
in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.” Id. at 627. The Attorney General may grant a
cancellation of removal for aliens who meet certain criteria. Under 8
U.S.C. § 1229b, an alien deportable for having been involved in terrorist
activity is precluded from obtaining such relief. Id. The petitioner alien
argued that he should not be precluded from this relief because he pled
guilty in 1980. Id. at 629.
Circuits are split as to whether reliance on a former statute is
required to establish impermissible retroactivity. The 3rd and 4th Circuits
have taken the approach that a showing of reliance is not necessary to
find a retroactive effect. Id. at 630. Conversely, the 2nd and 7th Circuits
have noted that reliance should not be considered at all. This court,
agreeing with the 7th Circuit’s view on the “absurdity of arguing that one
would not have committed a crime in the first place, or might have
resisted conviction more vigorously, if he had known he could not ask
for a § 212(c) waiver,” held that there was no retroactive effect in
applying the IIRIRA. Id. at 629-30.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE

Statute of Limitations: Heck Deferred Accrual Rule – Gibson v.
Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law and Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427
(3d Cir. 2005)
The 3rd Circuit found that there had not been delayed accrual of
claims according to the Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) deferred
accrual rule for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment in violation
of the Fourth Amendment stemming from a previous criminal conviction
where the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 450. The court
recognized a circuit split concerning the analysis to be applied when
deciding whether the Heck rule should allow an extension of the statute
of limitations. Id. at 448. The 3rd, 8th and 10th Circuits find that the
Heck rule will not apply to claims where the success on the claims would
not invalidate the prior conviction. Id. at 437. The 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th
and 11th Circuits, however, all endorse a more fact-specific analysis of
the claims to determine whether the allow the statute of limitations to be
extended through the Heck rule. Id. at 448.
Federal Claims Act: Qui tam cases – Shaw v. AAA Eng’g, 138 F.
App’x 62 (10th Cir. 2005)
In this case, the 10th Circuit dismissed the defendant’s cross appeal
because the notice of appeal was untimely and thus the court did not
have jurisdiction. Id. at 74. The court explained that the defendant could
not rely on the 60-day provision under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B)
because the United States was not a party to the action. Id.
In a qui tam action under the Federal Claims Act (“FCA”), the
United States can choose to either go forward or withdraw from the
lawsuit. Id. at 75. Under the former version of the FCA, the 10th Circuit
held in Petrofsky v. Van Colt, 588 F.2d 1327 (10th Cir. 1978), that if the
United States chooses to withdraw from the suit, the parties are no longer
afforded a 60-day provision to file a notice of appeal. Id. at 74. Here, the
10th Circuit pointed out that under the current version of the FCA, other
circuits, including the 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits, have disagreed with its
decision in Petrofsky. The 10th Circuit noted, however, that the
disagreement from the other circuits has not resulted from any pertinent
changes under the FCA, but merely out of the “concern that qui tam
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plaintiffs may be misled into believing that the United States is a party,”
and under the belief that “Rule 4(a)(1) should be construed to reduce
uncertainty.” As a result, the 10th Circuit held that it would adhere to its
reasoning under Petrofsky.
Jurisdiction: Post-Interlocutory Appeals – McCauley v.
Halliburton Energy Servs., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005)
This case involves a split among the federal circuits regarding
whether an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for
arbitration divests the district court of jurisdiction to hear the merits of
the underlying claim while the appeal is pending. Id. at 1160. The 2nd
and 9th Circuits held that the district court may proceed with the case
during the interlocutory appeals process. The 7th and 11th Circuits,
however, have stayed district court proceedings until the interlocutory
appeal has been resolved (so long as the appeal is not frivolous). The
10th Circuit agreed with the 7th and 11th Circuits, holding that the case
is to be stayed, absent a showing by the opposing party (and a
certification by the district court) that the appeal is either frivolous or
was forfeited.
Habeas Corpus: Availability of Relief Pending Other Forms of
Judicial Review – Lee v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2005)
Circuits are split as to whether habeas corpus relief is available
when other means of judicial review are still available. Id. at 783-84. The
2nd and 3rd Circuits have held that “habeas corpus jurisdiction exists
even where a petition for review could have been filed.” Id. at 783.
Conversely, this circuit, along with the 1st, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits
assert that “a petitioner must exhaust available avenues of relief and turn
to habeas only when no other means of judicial review exists.” Id. at 786.
FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Federal Criminal Procedures: Sovereign Immunity – Clymore v.
United States, 415 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005)
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In this FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) action, defendant, after pleading
guilty to various drug charges, sought the return of property seized from
him by the federal government, or, in the alternative, monetary
compensation. Id. at 1114, 1118. The government claimed that it no
longer possessed the property, requiring the 10th Circuit to decide
whether, when return of the property is impossible, sovereign immunity
barred an award of monetary damages in a FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) action.
Id. at 1118. The Clymore court recognized that the circuits are split on
the issue, with the majority holding that monetary damages are barred by
sovereign immunity. Id. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th Circuits have all
held that monetary damages cannot be awarded by a court in a FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(e) action. Id. at 1118-19. The Clymore court also noted that
two circuits retained jurisdiction and allowed monetary damages when
the government has destroyed the subject property. Id. at 1119. In one
case, the 9th Circuit retained jurisdiction despite the destruction of the
subject property and remanded to the district court to allow for monetary
damages. Clymore, 415 F.3d at 1120. In another case, the 2nd Circuit
held that damages may be awarded in a FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) action. Id.
The 10th Circuit, however, joined with the majority of circuits in holding
that “sovereign immunity bars monetary relief in a Rule 41(e) proceeding
when the government no longer possesses the property.” Id.
Section 1983: Search and Seizure – Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2005)
This case required the court to decide whether qualified immunity
should apply in a case where plaintiff has brought a § 1983 claim against
a police officer for improperly allowing plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend to enter
her residence, accompanied by the police officer, and remove items
under the authority of a Protection of Abuse Order (“PFA”) in violation
of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 187-89. The majority opinion
declared, without discussion, that the constitutional violation of
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was clearly established. Id. The
dissent, however, noted a that a split exists amongst several circuits as to
whether or not an officer may rely on an order similar to a PFA to enter
property. Id. at 198-99 (Becker, J., dissenting). The 8th and 10th Circuits
have held that orders similar to a PFA do not allow an officer to enter a
premises while the 5th and 7th Circuits have held that an officer may
enter a residence in order to retrieve property (5th Circuit) and that it is
not clearly established that a PFA does not substitute for a warrant (7th
Circuit). Id. at 199. Circuit Judge Becker states that because the law is
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not clearly established on this point, qualified immunity should have
applied to the officer. Id.
Standing: Rights to Participate in Adjudications – Ashley Creek
Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2005)
This case involved the decision of whether an entity with a purely
economic interest in the issuance of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) had standing to bring a claim that the EIS involved was deficient.
The 9th Circuit noted that the statute at issue, § 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Protection Act, does not provide a private right of action.
The court found that the instant matter concerned purely economic, not
environmental, interests; thus, there was no private right of action. Id. at
939-40
This ruling conflicted with 8th Circuit decisions holding that purely
economic interests could fall within § 102(2)(C)’s zone of interests. Id. at
941. The 9th Circuit stated that while § 102(2)(C)(iv) (the provision
relied upon by the 8th Circuit) did address the issue of “productivity,” it
did so only in terms of the “relationship between uses of the environment
and productivity” and therefore the statute did not “require a discussion
of the impacts on productivity that [were] not intertwined with the
environment.” Id.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
SENTENCING

Post-Booker: Plain Error Review – United States v. GonzalezHuerta, 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005)
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), courts are no longer required to impose
a sentence that falls within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines”), but must only consider the Guidelines in determining
sentences. In this post-Booker appeal, the issue was whether the lower
court’s mandatory application of the Guidelines constituted reversible
error when the lower court relied solely on the defendant’s prior
convictions and admitted facts in determining his maximum sentence.
Because the issue was not raised below, the court reviewed the claim
under a plain error standard, which requires “(1) error, (2) that is plain,
which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
732. The court held that to satisfy the third prong, the defendant must
show that “the error . . . affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” Id. In doing so, the court declined to adopt the approach of
the 2nd and 7th Circuits, which provide for limited remands to determine
whether the district court would issue a lower sentence. Further, the court
refused to collapse the third and fourth prong analyses, which several
other courts of appeals have done.
The appellant argued that he bears the burden under the third prong
to show that his substantial rights were affected. The court held that
although there is a limited exception for “structural errors,” which the
court defines as a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself,” the court
held that the type of error committed below, what the court calls a “nonconstitutional Booker error,” is not a structural error and defendant
therefore bears the burden of showing the he satisfied the third prong. Id.
at 733-34. Alternatively, the appellant argued that “when a case is
pending on appeal and an intervening decision overturns law that was
well-settled while the case was in the district court, the appellee should
bear the burden to establish that substantial rights were not affected.” Id.

262

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:247

at 734. In rejecting this argument, the court declined to adopt the
approach taken by the 6th Circuit. Id. at 735.
Post-Booker: Plain Error Review – United States v. Pirani, 406
F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005)
The Supreme Court has held that “before an appellate court can
correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is
plain, (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 550 (citing United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993)). Olano also noted a 4th part to
the test that would allow for discretion by the court if “the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. Here, the 8th Circuit noted a split among the circuits
with regard to the third factor, whether the error “affected substantial
rights.” United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. The court noted that, in
interpreting the third Olano factor, it agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th
and 11th Circuits. Id. at 551. These circuits reason that the third Olano
factor turns on whether the appellant “has demonstrated a reasonable
probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence with
the Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines advisory.” Id. In
addition, the court stated that, like the 5th and 11th Circuits, it rejects
“the limited remand approach as contrary to [the] obligation as an
appellate court to apply the third and fourth Olano factors based upon the
existing record on appeal.” Id. at 552. Lastly, the court noted that, like
the 1st, 5th and 11th Circuits, the court could “consider whether to
exercise . . . discretion under the fourth Olano factor to review a forfeited
Booker error, the defendant must show a ‘reasonable probability,’ based
on the appellate record as a whole, that but for the error he would have
received a more favorable sentence.” Id.
Post-Booker: Standard of Review – United States v. Higdon, 418
F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005)
On appeal, in a supplemental brief, the defendant claimed the
sentence he received must be reviewed based upon the decisions in
Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker. Id. at 1137. The
majority held that parties must bring challenges to sentencing
enhancements in their initial brief or on appeal. Id. The dissent pointed
out that this decision makes the 11th Circuit the only circuit to interpret
the “prudential issues-not-briefed-are-waived rule in such a strict
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fashion.” Id. The dissent concluded that all other circuits have considered
the merits of claims that are similar to the case at bar and have
considered Blakely/Booker claims even when not submitted in the initial
brief. Id. at 1145.
Post-Booker: Remand – United States v. Sanders, 421 F.3d 1044
(9th Cir. 2005)
This case required the 9th Circuit to decide whether to grant limited
remand, full remand, or a modified limited remand in cases where the
original sentencing judge is unavailable and the sentence needs to be
remanded due to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Sanders, 421 F.3d at 1051-52. Normally,
the 9th Circuit grants a limited remand, but held in this case that granting
limited remand for sentencing under Booker should not apply when the
original sentencing judge is not available. Id.
The 2nd Circuit, by contrast, has held that a modified limited
remand should be granted, which would create two alterations to the
standard limited remand. Id. at 1052. The 9th Circuit, however, declared
that this is in essence the same result as granting a full remand and,
therefore, refused to accept the 2nd Circuit’s rationale because the 9th
Circuit believes that the confusing terminology will only serve to be
misleading. Id.
Potentially Consecutive Sentencing – United States v. Cox, 125 F.
App’x 973 (10th Cir. 2005)
Appellant was sentenced to 168 months, “to run consecutively to
his sentence on [a] state charge, which had not yet been imposed.” Id. at
973. The issue was whether it was permissible for a court to order a
sentence, such as this, which would run consecutively to a potential
future sentence. Id. The court noted a split among the circuits on this
issue, in which the 2nd, 5th, 8th, and 11th Circuits hold that such
sentences are allowed. Id. However, the 6th, 7th and 9th Circuits hold
that such sentences are not permissible. Id. The 10th Circuit, reaffirming
a prior holding, sided with the 2nd, 5th, 8th and 11th Circuits.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Evidence Obtained from Detention: Suppression – United States
v. Pulliam, 405 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005)
On appeal was the district court’s ruling to suppress the
introduction of a gun into evidence that was found during an illegal
search and seizure of a car in which the defendant was only a passenger
and had no possessory interest in. The 9th Circuit held that because the
defendant did not have a possessory interest in the vehicle, his rights
were not violated by the illegal search and seizure of the vehicle.
However, the court agreed with the district court that the defendant was
detained in violation of his 4th Amendment rights. Accordingly, the 9th
Circuit held that “to suppress the gun, [the defendant] must show that it
is in ‘some sense the product’ of his unlawful detention.” Id. at 787.
Applying this standard, 9th Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that the “discovery and seizure of the gun was simply in no sense the
product of any violation of [the defendant’s] 4th Amendment rights.” Id.
The dissent, in arguing that the “detention of the vehicle and the
detention of its occupants are part of a single, integrated instance of
unconstitutional police conduct,” noted a circuit split on this issue. Id. at
794 (Wardlaw, J. dissenting). The dissent pointed to a 5th Circuit ruling
that analyzed the lower court’s decision to suppress evidence the same
for both driver and passenger. The dissent stated that the 5th Circuit “did
not require the passenger to demonstrate that, but for his, and only his,
illegal detention, the evidence would not have been found.” Id.
Warrantless Searches: Reasonableness – United States v.
Plummer, 409 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2005)
There is a split among circuits on the issue of whether an officer’s
actual motivation for conducting a protective, warrantless search is
relevant to the reasonableness analysis set forth by Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 24 (1968). While the 7th Circuit “reason[s that] a particular
officer’s motivation is irrelevant to the Terry analysis, the First and Ninth
consider the actual motivation of an officer dispositive.” The 8th Circuit,
siding with the 7th Circuit, declared that the subjective belief of the
searching officer should not be factored into a determination of validity.
Id. at 909. Rather, “such a search is valid if a hypothetical officer in the
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same circumstances could reasonably believe the suspect is dangerous.”
Id.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Racketeering: Definition of “Facility in Interstate Commerce” –
United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2005)
This case required the 2nd Circuit to address a circuit split over
whether, under 18 U.S.C. § 1958, a facility of interstate commerce must
be actually used in interstate commerce. The defendant appealed his
conviction under § 1958(a), which criminalizes the use of a “facility in
interstate . . . commerce” in committing a murder for hire. Id. at 303.
Defendant argued that the facility of interstate commerce in question, the
telephone, was used only to make intrastate calls, and thus fell outside
the scope of § 1958(a). Id. The court noted that the 5th and 7th Circuits
do not require that the facility actually be used in interstate commerce.
Id. at 304. The 6th Circuit, however, has disagreed by holding that the
use of the facility of interstate commerce must affect interstate
commerce. Id. The Perez court adopted the reasoning of the 5th and 7th
Circuits by holding that because § 1958(b) used the phrase “facility of
interstate commerce,” that phrase and “facility in interstate commerce” in
§ 1958(a) should be read interchangeably. Id. Therefore, the court held,
under § 1958, the use of a facility of interstate commerce need not be
actually used interstate. Id. at 304-05.
RICO: Business or Property Injuries – Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d
897 (9th Cir. 2005)
Plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully imprisoned and that his
wrongful imprisonment caused a loss of employment and employment
opportunities as well as compensation losses resulting therefrom. Id. at
898. Plaintiff appealed the lower court’s decision that he lacked standing
on the grounds that he did not allege an injury to business or property as
required by the RICO statute. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed under
recent precedent established under Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d
1179 (9th Cir. 2002), in which it the court held that a property interest
exists in the “legal entitlement to business relations” and, therefore, a
qualifying injury is established under RICO when that interest is
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hampered. Id. at 899. The court, noting that no elaboration on the
standard was provided in Mendoza, reasoned that harm to a specific
interest in business or property is required to satisfy the RICO statute and
that state law determines whether that specific interest amounts to
property. Id.
The dissent argued that by extending the Mendoza standard the
majority created a circuit split with the 7th and 11th Circuits, which held
that losses resulting from personal injury were incompensable under
RICO. Id. at 908 (Gould, J., dissenting). The dissent urged the court to
adhere to the reasoning of the 11th and 7th Circuit and hold that
plaintiff’s loss of employment claim was only a secondary effect of his
allegedly false imprisonment and that his loss should be considered a
personal injury and not a business and property injury within the
meaning of the RICO statute. Id. at 909.
Firearms: Right to Possess – United States v. Brailey, 408 F.3d
609 (9th Cir. 2005)
In this case, the 9th Circuit addressed the issue of whether someone
who is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and
prohibited from possessing a gun, can come under 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(B)(ii), an exception for persons who have had their “civil
rights restored.” Id. at 610. The 9th Circuit sided with the 4th, 8th, and
D.C. Circuits in holding that “a person convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence cannot benefit from the federal restoration
exception.” Id. at 612. Since the misdemeanor conviction did not remove
the “core civil rights of voting, serving as a juror, or holding public
office, his civil rights have not been ‘restored’ within the meaning of
federal law.” Id. at 613. The 6th Circuit has taken a different position in
holding that persons who commit misdemeanors under state law cannot
be convicted under the statute because their civil rights were never lost.
Id. The 9th Circuit dismissed this reasoning and declared that “not all
persons convicted of a misdemeanor become prohibited persons; only
those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence are
persons prohibited from possessing guns.” Id.
Firearms: Violation During a Drug Transaction – United States
v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005).
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A circuit split developed during the 1990s over the question of
“whether exchanges of drugs and guns could, without more, violate 18
U.S.C. § 924(c).” Id. at 763. During the early- and mid-90s, “§ 924(c)
only criminalized the ‘use’ of firearm ‘during or in relation to’ a drug
crime.” However, Congress took action in 1998 to broaden the
jurisdictional scope of § 924(c). Id. The new § 924(c) “prohibits not only
the ‘using’ a firearm ‘during or in relation to’ a drug trafficking crime,
but also simply ‘possessing’ a firearm ‘in furtherance of’ such a crime.”
Id. at 764. The 6th Circuit noted that the 2nd Circuit has declared that the
new §924(c) eliminates the previous circuit split over the matter. Id. The
6th Circuit, however, believes that the interpretation of the statute needs
to be read more narrowly because of the phrase “in furtherance of.” Id.
The 6th Circuit held that the phrase ‘in furtherance of” should be
interpreted with “‘its ordinary or natural meaning,’ which is ‘a helping
forward: advancement, promotion.’” Id. Hence, “the weapon must
promote or facilitate the crime.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mackey,
265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2005). The court thus declared that a
“specific nexus” must exist between the drug transaction and possession
of a firearm. Id.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Standard of Review: Frivolity Dismissals – Cummings v. Baker,
130 F. App’x 446 (11th Cir. 2005)
A state prisoner appealed the district court’s frivolity review of his
claim for an injunction forcing the court to address his motion for
resentencing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Id. at 447. The 11th
Circuit noted that the circuits are split regarding the correct standard of
review for frivolity dismissals. Id. at 448. Though some circuits review
such matters for abuse of discretion (e.g. 5th Circuit) and others review
de novo (e.g. 2nd Circuit), the 11th circuit held that the prisoner’s claim,
which must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding, failed regardless
of the applicable standard of review. Id.
Standard of Review: Equitable Tolling Available for § 2255
Habeas Corpus Petition – United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089
(8th Cir. 2005)
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In this case, the 8th Circuit addressed, as a matter of first
impression, whether equitable tolling of the statute of limitations
contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is available to a defendant where the
defendant’s motion was untimely due to misconduct by the defendant’s
lawyer. Id. at 1093. The court held that equitable tolling does apply to a §
2255 petition because equitable tolling is available under § 2254, and
because its has the same operative language and purpose as § 2254. Id. at
1092. Thus, § 2255 is the “statutory analogue of habeas corpus for
persons in federal custody.” Id. at 1093. The court noted that the 6th, 7th,
9th, 10th and 11th Circuits are all currently in agreement on this point.
Id. at 1093-94. However, in determining whether the district court
properly allowed for equitable tolling, the 8th Circuit noted that the
courts are split on whether the review of the district court’s decision
should be de novo or for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1092. The 6th, 9th,
11th and D.C. circuits review de novo, while the 5th and 10th Circuits
review for abuse of discretion. Id. Finally, the 8th Circuit held that a de
novo review was appropriate in this case because § 2255’s
characterization as an analogue to § 2254 demands a consistent treatment
of the standard of review. Id. at 1093. Thus, where § 2254 is reviewed de
novo, it would be appropriate to review § 2255 motions de novo as well.
See id. at 1093.
Standard of Review: Franks Hearing – United States v. Lewis,
139 F. App’x 455 (3d Cir. 2005)
The 3rd Circuit noted, but did not add to, a split regarding the
standard of review for a denial of a Franks hearing. Id. at 457. A district
court uses a Franks hearing in criminal proceedings to inquire into
allegations that a submitted affidavit is deliberately false or recklessly
disregards the truth. Id. The 3d Circuit noted that the 1st, 2nd and 7th
Circuits review Franks hearing denials for clear error; the 5th and 9th
Circuits review de novo; and the 8th Circuit reviews for abuse of
discretion. Id. The 3rd Circuit, however, did not take a position on the
proper scope of review within that circuit because the denial in this case
satisfied the most exacting standard: de novo review. Id.
Jury Instructions: Mixed Terminology – United States v. Dowlin,
408 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. 2005)
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This case addressed whether the interchangeable use of the terms
“not guilty” and “innocence” constituted error in jury instructions. The
10th Circuit found that, “in light of the instruction as a whole we do not
see how the jury was misled concerning its obligation to apply the
presumption of innocence.” Id. at 666. In so holding, the 10th Circuit
departed from the 1st Circuit’s view that “interchanging the terms could
confuse a jury and ‘risk[] undercutting the government’s burden by
suggesting that they should find the defendant guilty if they think he is
not innocent—regardless of how convincing the government’s proof has
been.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mendoz-Acevedo, 950 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1991)). The 10th Circuit, however, found that the terms “were not
likely to confuse the jury in applying the proper burden of proof.” Id.
Firearm Possession: Scienter Requirement – United States v.
Erhart, 415 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2005)
Among other convictions, defendant was convicted of possession of
a firearm in trying to sell a sawed-off shotgun to a “patient” who was an
undercover cooperating witness, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). On
appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in convicting him of
possession of a firearm with a barrel less than eighteen inches (one of the
weapons prohibited by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1)); specifically that there
was “insufficient evidence to show that he knew the characteristics of the
prohibited weapon.” Id. at 968-69. The statute is silent, however, as to
the requisite mens rea for illegal possession. Here, the 8th Circuit
concluded that the only knowledge required to support a conviction
under the National Firearms Act is knowledge that the weapon is a
“firearm” as that term is generally defined. Id. at 969. Following the
logic of the Supreme Court decision in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600 (1994), the 8th Circuit further concluded that if the characteristics of
the weapon render it “quasi-suspect,” then the owner of the weapon does
not have to know the specific characteristics to violate the Act. Id. This
reasoning differs from the 5th Circuit’s position that “there is no
principled reason to suggest Congress intended the eight categories of
firearms listed in the … statute to have different mens rea elements.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104, 109 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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Jurisdiction: Prisoner Release Conditions – United States v.
D’Amario, 412 F.3d 253 (1st Cir. 2005)
The 1st Circuit undertook a review of a district court’s modification
of conditions of a prisoner’s release, under which the court revoked the
supervised release of defendant and sentenced him back to prison. Id. at
254-55. Defendant argued that the appeal of the revocation order
divested the district court of jurisdiction to change aspects of his
supervised release and contended that jurisdiction of the case belonged
with the appellate court. Id. at 255. The court noted that the 9th and 10th
Circuits have retained jurisdiction in similar instances, whereas the 1st
and 8th Circuits have held that the district court “[did] not lose all
jurisdiction upon appeal.” Reaffirming a prior holding, the 1st Circuit
held that the district court had the jurisdiction to modify defendant’s
conditions of his supervised release. Id. at 257.
Identification Testimony: Admissibility – United States v. Dixon,
413 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2005)
The 6th Circuit was presented with a case involving the
admissibility of identification evidence of an alleged actor in an extortion
plot. Id. at 543. The U.S. government tried to have defendant’s son and
ex-wife testify whether they recognized defendant as the perpetrator
captured on a videotape surveillance of the crime scene. Id. at 544. The
district court excluded the identification testimony, which became the
issue on appeal. Id. In affirming the exclusion of the testimony, the court
noted that such decisions are reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. In making its decision, the court noted that the 8th Circuit
found that a lay opinion concerning identification of a photograph was
admissible if “there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more
likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the
jury.” Id. (quoting United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158, 1160
(8th Cir. 1984)). This contrasts with United States v. Pierce, where the
11th Circuit used a four part test to determine admissibility: (1) the
witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance, (2) the witness’s
familiarity of the defendant’s appearance at the time the photograph was
taken, (3) whether the defendant had disguised his appearance at the time
of the offense, and (4) whether the defendant had changed his appearance
prior to trial. Id. (quoting Pierce, 136 F.3d 774, 774-75 (11th Cir. 1998)).
The 1st Circuit also considers the quality and clarity of the photograph.
In upholding the district court’s ruling, the 6th Circuit did not articulate
its own admissibility test, but instead created a sort of hybrid by applying
all of the factors set out by the other circuits. Id. at 545-46.

